| Hines Hill train collision | |
|---|---|
| Details | |
| Date | 14 January 1996 |
| Location | Hines Hill, Western Australia |
| Country | Australia |
| Operator | National Rail Corporation |
| Type of incident | Collision |
| Cause | Signal passed at danger |
| Statistics | |
| Trains | 2 |
| Deaths | 2 |
The Hines Hill train collision occurred on the Eastern Goldfields Railway on 14 January 1996 at Hines Hill, Western Australia. Two trains entered a crossing loop simultaneously in opposing directions, although signals at the exit from the crossing loop were correctly showing red for stop.
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The trains involved were National Rail Corporation's 5SP5 intermodal Sydney to Perth freighter, and Westrail's 7025 Perth to Kalgoorlie freighter.
The National Rail train in one direction misjudged the stop, and went past the red signal, hitting the last wagons of the Westrail train. Unfortunately, these wagons were tankers containing diesel which burst into flames, destroying the train data recorders that might have explained what speed the train was travelling at. The driver and a teenage guest passenger were killed. National Rail locomotives AN10 and DL37 were written off due to being damaged beyond repair.
The accident happened at night, and there were no distance boards which might have helped the driver of the NR train judge the distance to the stop signal showing red.
The signalling was later altered to prevent trains entering the crossing loop simultaneously.
The accident illustrates the hazard of having crossing loops only just long enough to hold the two trains. If the loop had been longer, the safety distance from the red departure signal to the fouling point with the arriving train would have been larger and the other train would have cleared the single line section so avoiding the collision by some vital seconds.
Since the accident, the crossing loop at Hines Hill has been lengthened for longer 1,800 m trains. The loop is now 2,304 m long, which is considerably longer than the normal longest train. The extra distance provides both a safety margin and faster crosses, since a train entering the loop can clear the single line at a higher speed. It is not known if the simultaneous arrival signalling has been restored.
The extra distance is to accommodate longer trains & has nothing to do with faster crossings as have other crossing loops on the Avon to Kalgoorlie Line
This accident would have been prevented if the station had been fitted with Automatic Train Protection (ATP), such as the Eurobalise system. Beacons at the signals together with other intermediate beacons approaching signals would have regulated the speed of the trains to a safer level.
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